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ABSTRACT 
Unlike what is the case for physical entities and other types of 
continuants, few process ontologies exist. This is not only because 
processes received less attention in the research community, but also 
because classifying them is challenging. Moreover, upper level categories 
or classification criteria to help in modelling and integrating lower level 
process ontologies have thus far not been developed or widely adopted. 
This paper proposes a basis for further classifying processes in the Basic 
Formal Ontology. The work is inspired by the aspectual characteristics of 
verbs such as homeomericity, cumulativity, telicity, atomicity, 
instantaneity and durativity. But whereas these characteristics have been 
proposed by linguists and philosophers of language from a linguistic 
perspective with a focus on how matters are described, our focus is on 
what is the case in reality thus providing an ontological perspective. This 
was achieved by first investigating the applicability of these characteristics 
to the top-level processes in the Gene Ontology, and then, where possible, 
deriving from the linguistic perspective relationships that are faithful to 
the ontological principles adhered to by the Basic Formal Ontology. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Living, growing, learning, purchasing, producing, sleeping, 
and mating are examples of different types of processes, i.e. 
entities with temporal parts that depend on other entities to occur. 
The importance of process ontologies is rapidly 
increasing in several domains such as in event discovery 
(Nevatia et al 2004, Li et al 2017), industry and engineering 
(Morbach at 2007), software engineering (Ruy et al 2015), 
affective computing (Li et al 2016), among others. In 
biomedicine, there are several ontologies that have been 
recently developed or extended to cover a wide spectrum of 
types of processes, such as the process components of the 
Gene Ontology, the Emotion Ontology, and the Mental 
Functioning Ontology, to name a few. The Gene ontology 
(GO 2001) groups all processes under biological process, 
which is informally defined as a collection of molecular 
events, specifically pertinent to the functioning of living 
beings and with defined temporal beginning and end. There 
are about 26k biological processes in the Gene ontology 
classified under 27 top-level processes, such as growth, 
development, behavior, response to stimulus, metabolic and 
immune system processes. These top-level processes were 
developed and are being extended without a formal or 
foundational framework. The Mental Functioning Ontology 
(Hastings et al. 2012) was developed as a framework to 
enable developing other ontologies related to mental health 
and diseases. It distinguishes between the aspects of mental 
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functionings that are occurrents and those that are 
continuants. For example, intelligence and personality are 
dispositions while behaviors and mental processes are 
bodily processes. The memory image I have about my dad 
now (a cognitive representation) is related to my 
remembering him now (a mental process). There are about 
80 mental processes (e.g., learning, thinking, wanting, 
arousal, and perception) and about 500 behavioral processes 
(e.g., cognitive, rhythmic and social behaviors). A related 
ontology, the Emotion Ontology (Hastings et al., 2011) 
distinguishes between three notions related to specifying 
emotions: emotional processes, emotional dispositions, and 
mental representations. About 170 types of processes have 
been covered in this ontology including emotion processes, 
mood processes, and emotional behaviors.  
In BFO (Arp et. al. 2015, Smith et. al. 2012), processes 
and process boundaries are defined under occurrents, but 
they are not elaborated further. Processes are those entities 
that occur, happen, unfold, or develop in time, have 
temporal proper parts, and depend on some continuant entity 
to happen. Process boundaries are other types of occurrents 
that occupy zero-dimensional temporal regions, thus they do 
not have temporal parts and are not processes themselves. 
Examples of process boundaries are the moment of a 
person’s birth, and that what is described by terms such as 
‘midnight’, ‘departure’, and ‘arrival’. 
In DOLCE (Masolo 2002), the corresponding entities are 
called perdurants, which are those entities that happen in 
time, by accumulating different temporal parts: thus at any 
time t at which they exist, only their temporal parts at t are 
present. DOLCE was inspired for its classification by the 
lexical semantics literature, thereby leaning on properties 
such as homeomericity and cumulativity, which were used 
to classify perdurants into states and processes if they are 
accumulative, or into accomplishments and achievements if 
they are non-accumulative. States are distinguished from 
processes if they are homeomeric, and achievements are 
distinguished from accomplishments if they are atomic.  
Although DOLCE and BFO are based on distinct 
perspectives, it is not unreasonable to view processes and 
accomplishments in DOLCE as what are processes in BFO. 
However, how achievements and states are to be interpreted 
by BFO remains unclear. If achievements are instantaneous 
happenings with zero-time duration then they correspond to 
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BFO’s process boundaries. If, however, instantaneity is 
meant to be a short period of time, then they are BFO 
processes. Additionally, states in DOLCE cannot be BFO 
processes as they do not involve change.  
Early research in philosophy and linguistics provided 
different accounts of the so-called events, suggesting various 
views and criteria to distinguish between actions, activities, 
accomplishments, achievements, processes, performances 
states, mental and physical events, bodily movements, and 
others (c.f., Casati et al 2015). Most of this research was 
originally devoted to the semantics of verbal phrases,  the so-
called ‘lexical aspect’ of verbs, and how they are structured 
in relation to time. Figure 1 reflects our understanding of how 
some of these accounts (e.g., Moens et al 1988, Bhatt 2005, 
Levin 2009) may be combined. (Vendler 1957) classified 
events into: activities, states, accomplishments, and 
achievements. This proposal was later revised and extended 
(e.g., Mourelatos 1978, Bach 1986, Krifka 1998, Caudal et 
al. 2005, Trypuz et al 2007). Krifka made it very clear that 
caution is required: these classifications are about predicates, 
i.e. descriptions, denoting entities such as processes in 
reality, and are not classifications about processes 
themselves: the same process can be described by distinct 
predicates each one of which can be classified differently. 
Moreover, processes and events might be lexicalized in 
different ways in natural languages. For example, the exact 
same event instance of John’s speaking to Mary yesterday, 
can be said in different ways, such as ‘I heard John speaking 
with Mary, ‘John speaks with Mary’, or ‘John spoke with 
Mary’. The difference between those English phrases is 
ontologically irrelevant as they all refer to the same event. 
Furthermore, there are verbs that do not denote or refer to 
events, such as ‘It costs 20$’, ‘It weights 20kg’, or ‘It looks 
easy’, which do not imply changes, as discussed earlier. 
Similarly, there are events that cannot be typically 
lexicalized using verbs, such as ‘war’ and ‘conference’. 
In this paper, we examine the most commonly discussed 
criteria in the literature to classify events and verbal 
predicates: homeomericity, cumulativity, atomicity, telicity, 
durativity and instantaneity. Other aspectual notions, such as 
incrementality and structure (Caudal 2005), distributivity 
and collectivity (Champollion 2014), and quantization 
(Krifka 1998), are here not dealt with.  
 
Fig. 1. Overview of the aspectual classification of verbs.  
2 GENE ONTOLOGY PROCESSES 
To test the applicability of these notions, we attempted 
to use them to analyze and annotate the top level processes 
in the Gene Ontology. Table 1 illustrates a sample of these 
GO processes. The full annotations (and documentation of 
choices) can be accessed online1. We selected the 35 most 
top-level processes, that top all other (~45k) processes in the 
Gene Ontology.  
It is worth noting that the top-level processes in the 
Gene ontology include not only process universals, but also 
defined classes, such as Single-Organism Process and 
Multi-Organism Process. Such process types cannot be 
classified according to criteria such as whether they are e.g., 
homeomeric or telic because they are collections of different 
types of processes, defined based on the number of the 
organisms involved. Therefore, instead of selecting these 
processes, we selected and annotated their subtypes.  
This initial effort turned out to be a challenging task for 
two reasons: (1) shortcomings in the literature about what 
precisely is to be understood by these notions, and (2) their 
focus on how matters are described (the linguistic 
perspective), rather than on what is the case (the ontological 
perspective). 
 
 
Table 1. Sample of the top-level GO processes annotated. 
In the next sections, we examine the most commonly used 
aspectual criteria and discuss whether and how they might be 
used for further classifying processes in the spirit of BFO. 
3 DEFINITIONS   
Central in our approach is the distinction between 
temporal parts of processes, such as the first year of a 
toddler’s life, and mere occurrent parts of processes, as 
each of the eating processes that are part of a toddler’s life. 2  
p occurrent-part-of q        (R1) 
a primitive relation of parthood holding independently 
of time between two process instances when one is a sub-
process of the other (Arp et al 2015:135). 
  
1 http://github.com/mjarrar2/Processontology/wiki  
2 From here on forward, we follow the standard typographical conventions 
for particulars (lowercase, italics in definitions), universals (upper case) 
and relationships (bold for particular-level relationships, italics for 
universal-level relationships) (Arp et. al 2015) 
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P occurrent-part-of Q =def.:      (R2) 
for every particular occurrent p, if p instance-of P, then 
there is some particular occurrent q such that q instance-
of Q and p occurrent-part-of q (Arp et al 2015:139). 
 
p temporal-part-of q =def.      (R3) 
p occurrent-part-of q 
& for some temporal region r p spans r 
& for all occurrents c, r′ 
if (c spans r′ & r′ occurrent-part-of r 
then (c occurrent-part-of p iff c occurrent-
part-of q)) (Smith 2012, corrected). 
 
The relation ‘p spans r’ in R3 is shorthand for ‘p 
occupies spatiotemporal region str which occupies temporal 
region r’. R3 allows us to define the corresponding 
universal-level relation: 
P temporal-part-of Q =def.:      (R4) 
for every particular occurrent p, if p instance-of P, then 
there is some particular occurrent q such that q instance-
of Q and p temporal-part-of q.  
 
Figure 2 depicts an instance of PROCESS PROFILE, a 
subtype of PROCESS (Smith 2012). Displayed is a 
representation of an instance of a rhythm process profile, p1, 
which could be an occurrent-part-of the beating of some 
person’s heart or of the performance of a piece of music by 
a pianist and which in these cases would reflect the 
variations in the number of heart beats produced by that 
person’s heart, resp. musical bars played by the pianist 
(‘bpm’ = beats/bars per minute). The figure also depicts two 
processes of equal duration, p2 and p3 which both are 
temporal-part of p1, as well as the further temporal parts 
p4, p5, p7 and p8 which also are each of the same duration, 
be it half the duration of p2 and p3. Further depicted are the 
various defined classes instantiated by these processes. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Configurations of temporal parthood and homeomericity. 
3.1 Homeomericity 
DOLCE considers an occurrence to be homeomeric iff 
all of its temporal parts, in BFO sense, are described by the 
very expression used for the whole occurrence, a view 
which is close to the notion of homogeneity as defined in 
(Dowty 1977:60). An example of a homeomeric process in 
this DOLCE sense would be what is described by ‘sitting’. 
Defined in this way, homeomericity is a property of 
universals, not of instances. Although BFO is a 
classification of instances and not of universals, we can 
work around this by recognizing several flavors of this 
principle at the level of instances: 
(1) p isotypic-part-of q =def.       (R5) 
p temporal-part-of q  
& p instance-of all types instantiated by q.  
Example (figure 2): p6 isotypic-part-of p5. 
(2) p weakly-homeomeric-in P =def.    (R6) 
all temporal parts of p which are not process boundaries 
are instances of P. 
Examples (figure 2): p2 weakly-homeomeric-in DC1; p3 
weakly-homeomeric-in DC1. 
From R5 and R6 it follows that all parts of a process that 
is weakly-homeomeric-in some type are isotypic-part-of 
that process. 
(3) p strongly-homeomeric-in P =def.    (R7) 
all temporal parts of p which are not process boundaries 
are instances of P and there is no such part of p that 
instantiates a subtype of P.  
Example (figure 2): p5 strongly-homeomeric-in DC9, 
p8 strongly-homeomeric-in DC11.  
From R5 and R7 it follows that all parts of a process that 
is strongly-homeomeric-in some universal are isotypic-
part-of that process. 
Further to be investigated is whether it is worthwhile to 
introduce the DC ‘weakly-homeomeric-process’ as the DC 
formed by all processes which are – or have an occurrent 
part which is – weakly-homeomeric-in some process type. 
Also whether it would pay off to implement the notion of 
‘strongly-homeomeric-process’ as the DC formed by all 
processes which are– or have an occurrent part which is – 
strongly-homeomeric-in some process type or whether it 
would be sufficient to have an axiom directly at the level of 
the types to which it applies. In figure 2, this would hold for 
DC8, 9, 10 and 11. It is also worth noticing that whether any 
of the relations R5…7 holds, depends on whether (1) a pure 
metaphysical stance is taken or (2) reality is looked at 
through what an ontology allows us to see and what is 
observable at the level of instances. If a restricted 
ontological commitment would not allow us to observe or 
describe instances p4…p8, then, under that commitment, 
e.g., p1 would be strongly-homeomeric-in DC5 and DC6. 
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3.2 Cumulativity 
Cumulativity was extensively discussed in the lexical 
semantics literature (see e.g., Krifka 1989, and Champollion 
2014) in an attempt to describe verbs – not processes! – a 
distinction similar to what exists for mass nouns on the one 
hand and count nouns on the other hand: whereas two 
portions of water together make one (bigger) portion of water, 
two bottles of water together do not make one (bigger) bottle. 
This view was later adopted in DOLCE for classifying 
perdurants: a perdurant is cumulative if the mereological sum 
of two instances of a type of perdurant is also an instance of 
the same perdurant type; for example, ‘the sum of two sittings 
is still a sitting’ (Masolo 2002:24). Nevertheless, both this 
definition and the example are rather unclear. 
Looking at it from the BFO perspective, it leaves open 
the question what sort of mereological sum is intended. 
Does it include occurrent parthood (see R1), as when my 
sitting (p1) simultaneously with your sitting (p2) is summed 
to form p3 which is the sitting of the mereological sum of me 
and you? Would certain process aggregates such as an 
orchestra playing a symphony being the mereological sum 
of the playings of the individual musicians plus the directing 
of the conductor? Or is it exclusively temporal parthood 
(R3) such as my sitting during the first 30 minutes of my 
total sitting and my sitting during the last 30 minutes? 
The DOLCE documentation about cumulativity as well as 
related proposals advanced in the linguistic community are not 
at all clear whether the sort of cumulativity they have in mind 
is a property of processes or of how a process is described. 
(Champollion 2014, Galton 2016), for instance, contend that 
cumulativity has more to do with the level of detail at which a 
process is described, rather than what it is ontologically: if a 
process p is described as ‘flying’ then cumulativity holds, as 
the sum of any two parts of such a flying is also a flying. 
However, if the very same p is described as ‘flying from 
London to New York’ then cumulativity, under their view, 
does not hold. From the BFO perspective, this meaning of 
cumulativity does not make sense: no entity becomes different 
because it is described differently. As with homeomericity, 
cumulativity as defined in DOLCE can be regarded as a 
property of some universals which requires some work-
arounds in BFO, f.i. : 
p cumulative-with q =def.     (R8) 
all process types instantiated by p and all process types 
instantiated by q are instantiated by p, q and p+q. 
Example (figure 2): p2 cumulative-with p3; DC1, DC5 
and DC6 are the all and only types that are instantiated by 
both p2 and p3, as well as p1 (the mereological sum of p2 and 
p3). 
P cumulative-in Q =def.     (R9) 
P isa Q 
& for all p1, p2 instance-of P: (p1+p2) instance-of Q. 
Example (figure 2): DC5 cumulative-in DC1. 
Clearly, if some process p is at least weakly-
homeomeric-in P then it is also instance-of a type which is 
cumulative-in P, but not vice versa. One could assume, for 
example, that instances of Growth as defined in the Gene 
ontology would be weakly-homeomeric-in Growth and that 
all subtypes of Growth would be cumulative-in Growth. 
Subtypes of Cell Aggregation, however, could be assumed 
to be cumulative-in Cell Aggregation, but for sure no 
instance of it would be strongly-homeomeric-in Cell 
Aggregation: not every temporal part of a cell aggregation 
process is of the same type (e.g. its sub-process ‘cells 
coming close to each other’ is not itself an aggregation). 
However, the mereological sum of two cell aggregations 
would be a cell aggregation. 
3.3 Telicity 
From a lexical semantics perspective, an action predicate 
is telic if it refers in one way or another to a terminal point 
for the action described as tending ‘towards a goal 
envisaged as realized in a perfective tense but contingent in 
an imperfective tense’ (Garey 1957:106). An action 
predicate is atelic if it does not mention any goal, purpose or 
endpoint, but can be used to denote an action as soon as it 
begins. For example, the predicate running is from such 
perspective considered atelic because it does not mention 
any goal or termination point. Furthermore, if somebody is 
running a marathon (process p), then the predicate running 
can be used to describe p immediately after its start, and 
independent of the outcome, i.e. whether or not the runner 
finishes. The predicate running a mile is however 
considered telic (Krifka 1989:9): it mentions an endpoint 
and it can only safely be applied to p after completion. The 
question we seek to answer is whether this notion of telicity 
can in one or other form be applied to processes themselves, 
rather than to predicates under which these processes are 
described. In BFO terms: is telicity a notion that applies 
only to representational units, or can it also be applied to 
that what the representational units are about? If the latter is 
the case, then telic processes would be those that have some 
terminal point or goal – whether or not these processes are 
described as such – and atelic ones those that do not.  
There are for sure processes that are telic under a 
specific interpretation of ‘terminal point’, i.e. all those 
which are finished! This is of course not what we have in 
mind here. What we do mean is that for a process to be telic, 
there must be something ‘in it’ what we informally can 
describe as ‘a change in the process’. However, this is just a 
matter of speaking as under the perspective of BFO, 
processes do not change because they are changes! 
Consider the current laws of physics on Earth, one being 
that objects such as a rock without support fall down to 
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Earth. The rock cannot keep falling down forever, it 
naturally stops when reaching a surface. Therefore, any such 
‘falling under natural Earth conditions’ is a telic process. 
This ‘falling’ terminates with (is followed by) a process that 
can be roughly described as ‘the coming to a stop’ and 
which can take the form of bouncing a bit (on a hard 
surface), or penetrating a soft surface (sand, for instance); it 
is this coming to a stop which is that what informally can be 
described as ‘the change in the process’. As another 
example, imagine that by looking through the 
representational units in figure 2 we do not just see the 
process profile p1 and the parts p2, p3, … thereof, but the 
actual beating of somebody’s heart b1 within that timeframe, 
and the process parts thereof – process parts being processes 
in their own right – b2, b3, …, such that p1 occurrent-part-
of b1, p2 occurrent-part-of b2, and so forth. Then b2 did not 
‘change’ when b4 terminated and b5 started, and neither did 
b1. b2 is the change! Remember also that from the BFO 
perspective it does not make sense to refer to processes ‘at a 
time’. We believe that telicity is once more not some unary 
property of an individual process, but rather something in 
relation to a universal. So we define: 
p is-telic-in R =def.      (R10) 
p instance-of P 
& there exists some process q instance-of Q and 
some process r instance-of R, such that  
 (1) q not instance-of P, (2) p not instance-of Q, 
 (3) p precedes q, and 
 (4) p and q are temporal-part-of r. 
Example (figure 2): each of p4 , p5, p7 is-telic-in DC1.  
P is-telic-in R =def.      (R11) 
for all process p instance-of P, p is-telic-in R. 
For example: falling (i.e. under normal earth conditions) 
is-telic-in moving (p is the falling proper, q is the coming to 
a stop (bouncing, penetrating, …), r=p+q is the entire 
motion process). Note that in general language, both p and r 
might be denoted by ‘falling’ Another example: ‘walking 
leg swing’ is-telic-in ‘walking’.  
We do not follow (Hennig 2008:262-4) according to 
which ‘a telic process can be interrupted any time but it can 
be only complete when its goal is reached’. Thus, if a person 
on a cross road intends to cross over and lifts up his left leg 
to start walking but gets immediately run over by a car, the 
movement that was initiated was a ‘leg swing’, though not a 
‘walking leg swing’. Our view is however compatible with 
(Krifka 1998) in that if a process is telic (in P), then there is 
no temporal part of it that is telic (in P). 
3.4 Instantaneity 
Some researchers distinguish between processes that are 
instantaneous and others that are durative (e.g., Garey 1957, 
Mourelatos 1978, Krifka 1998). They consider an event to 
be durative if it takes place over extended intervals, or 
instantaneous (also called punctual) if it takes just a 
moment, i.e., a complete action with no explicit internal 
temporal structure, such as arriving and departure. We argue 
that all processes are durative, and that there are no 
processes that happen instantly in zero-time. We distinguish 
between e.g., ‘the arriving of a train’ as a process extending 
over time, and ‘the arrival of a train’ as a process boundary.  
Nevertheless, the instantaneous events discussed in the 
linguistics literature are likely not meant to be time points or 
process boundaries, but rather, a sort of processes. Thus, we 
revise the definition of instantaneous processes to be those 
types of processes that are the peak moments of some longer 
processes. Processes like, knocking, hitting, departure, 
arrival, and dying are examples of processes that extend 
over time, but they have temporal parts that we call peak 
moments. For example, knocking the door starts when one 
moves his hand towards the door, then continues by 
touching and hitting the door for a short moment (the peak 
moment), and then releasing the hand. Similarly, the 
arriving of the train may start when the first trolley of the 
train starts entering the station, and decreases its speed into 
zero (the peak moment), wait a bit, and then open its doors.  
Notice that peak moments are critical parts. For 
example, if a process started with its agent intending it to be 
a knocking process but is terminated before its peak moment 
(i.e., before touching the door) then it is not a knocking, but 
if it is terminated directly after its peak then it is a knocking. 
In fact, this shows that instantaneous processes cannot be 
strongly-homeomeric-in some universal because their 
temporal parts before and after their peak are not of the 
same type. One may even slice a process into a higher 
granularity and ask at what time point a process is 
considered done, but we believe that this is irrelevant since 
the boundaries of instantaneous processes are typically fiat 
boundaries. For example, the exact starting and ending of 
knocking, and similarly a train’s arrival, are typically a 
matter of fiat determination. Further to be investigated is 
whether an entity (continuant or occurrent) is always created 
at a peak moment, e.g. a sound when knocking, a new 
individual when giving birth, a hole when drilling a wall, 
and so on. For this reason, no formalization for 
instantaneous processes has yet been decided upon. 
3.5 Atomicity 
Atomicity was adopted by DOLCE to distinguish 
between accomplishments (non-atomic) and achievements 
(atomic) (Masolo 2002:24) but its definition is unclear. A 
common understanding of it in the event semantic literature 
is that it is a one-step change-of-state, i.e., lacking any 
internal sub events (c.f., Caudal et al. 2005, Krifka 1998). 
But also this understanding of atomicity is problematic. 
Since every part of the temporal region occupied by a 
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process is occupied by a process which is part of the larger 
process, atomicity depends on the granularity level and is 
subject to one’s perspective. As pointed out in (Krifka 
1989:80): “The notion of different granularities can be 
applied in cases where an entity appears as atomic under 
one description and as composed of different entities under 
another description. For example, an arrival of a train at a 
station may be considered as atomic event or as an event 
which is composed of subevents… atomicity depends on the 
position we take towards the minimal part problem’. 
Therefore, we do not find it opportune (yet) to propose a 
formalization compatible with BFO. 
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
We have overviewed some known aspectual notions 
used to classify verbal phrases and examined their reuse to 
build process ontologies under BFO. We provided BFO-
compatible interpretations of homeomericity, cumulativity 
and telicity, discussed instantaneity, and explained that 
atomicity does not seem to be beneficial in classifying 
processes. We illustrated the use of these notions to analyze 
and annotate the top levels of the Gene Ontology processes. 
We plan to extend this work in several directions, including 
the full ontological analyses of the Gene Ontology 
processes, in order to detect possible modeling 
inconsistencies, as, for example, would be the case when a 
non-homeomeric process is declared a subtype of a 
homeomeric process, extending BFO process categories, as 
well as examining the use of these notions at a larger scale, 
such as restructuring of the process types found in WordNet. 
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